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Abstract. In this paper, we propose a new architecture based on an
efficient trust model and clustering algorithm in order to distribute a
certification authority (CA) for ensuring the distribution of certificates
in each cluster. We use the combination of fully self-organized security
for trust model like PGP adapted to ad-hoc technology and the cluster-
ing algorithm which is based on the use of trust and mobility metric,
in order to select the clusterhead and to establish PKI in each cluster
for authentication and exchange of data. Furthermore, we present new
approach Dynamic Demilitarized Zone (DDMZ) to protect CA in each
cluster. The principle idea of DDMZ consists to select the dispensable
nodes, also called registration authorities; these nodes must be confident
and located at one-hope from the CA. Their roles are to receive, filter and
treat the requests from any unknown node to CA. With this approach,
we can avoid the single point of failure in each cluster. This architecture
can be easily extended to other hierarchical routing protocols. Simulation
results confirm that our architecture is scalable and secure.
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1 Introduction
In recent years, much interest has been involved in the design of Mobile Ad-hoc
Network (MANET) technologies. Mobile ad-hoc networks are characterized by
their self-configuration, open peer-to-peer network architecture, shared wireless
medium, stringent resource constraints, and highly dynamic network topology.
These characteristics make them vulnerable to security attacks. Existing security
solutions for wired or wireless networks with infrastructure cannot be directly
applied to MANETs. Designing security solutions for MANET is the nontrivial
challenges. The goal of security solutions is to provide security services, such as
authentication, confidentiality, integrity, and availability to mobile users. In or-
der to achieve this goal, we must develop some key management systems adapted
to the characteristics of MANET.
In this article, we propose a new architecture based on an efficient trust model
and distributed clustering algorithm for designing the specific public key man-
agement systems. Our trust model is based on PGP (Pretty Good Privacy)
approach [1] adapted to MANET characteristics, like fully self-organized secu-
rity proposed by Hubaux et al. in [2]. Our distributed clustering algorithm uses
the trust level and mobility metric for the selection of the cluster head (CH)
which becomes certification authority (CA) in the cluster. In order to secure the
cluster formation, we propose a new scheme which uses dispensable confident
nodes, called registration authorities (RA). It consists to provide dynamic de-
militarized zone (DDMZ) at one-hope from the CA in each cluster. The role of
RAs is to protect CA, by receiving requests of certification, filtering and treating
these demands before forwarding them to the CA.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we discuss the
related work on current key management systems developed for MANET. In
section 3, we describe our global architecture, our trust model and the distrib-
uted clustering algorithm. In section 4, we present the simulation results of our
distributed hierarchical architecture. In section 5, we study and analyse the se-
curity of our system. The last section consists of the conclusion.
2 Related work
Several works have been proposed in the literature to deal with the security prob-
lems in ad hoc networks. Specially, we investigate the distributed CA approach
using threshold cryptography scheme and a clustering concept.
2.1 Distributed CA approach using threshold cryptography
Having a single central authority to distribute the public key certificate to all
nodes is not suitable for MANET, because this scheme is vulnerable to single
point of failure like ARAN (Authenticated Routing in Ad-hoc Networks protocol)
[13]. If this node is compromised, the entire network becomes compromised.
Zhou and Haas’s idea consists on distributing the CA role among n nodes of
the network using (n, k+1) threshold cryptography scheme [11]. In this scheme
the secret key is divided into n partial shares (S1, S2, · · · , Sn) where at least k+1
of n are partial shares which are needed to generate a secret S. The advantage is
its increased availability, since any k+1 among n nodes in the local neighborhood
of the requesting node can issue or renew a certificate. Another advantage is that
any node, which does not have a secret share yet, can obtain a share from any
group of at least k + 1 nodes which has already a share. Unfortunately, this
scheme has some drawbacks: First, the k + 1 nodes must be initialized by a
trusted authority. Second, the number k must be a trade-off between availability
and robustness. Third, the system overloads the network because instead of
sending only one request for obtaining certificate or revocation the node must
send at least k + 1 request (k traffic add in network).
2.2 A clustering concept
Mobile ad-hoc network may be represented as a set of clusters. Each cluster
is represented by a cluster-head (CH) and gateway nodes which manage the
communication with adjacent clusters. Among several secure solutions based on
clustering ad hoc networks which we studied, one is a cluster based security
architecture proposed by Becheler et al. [12]. This architecture use the threshold
cryptography scheme (n, k) to distribute CA. The idea is to distribute the private
key of CA over CHs where every CH holds a fragment of the whole key. In
order to be certified, any guest node must possess a certain number (W ) of
warranty certificates from warrantor nodes. After that, it must request at least
(k) certificates from different CHs, whose association of these k certificates gives
the network certificate. The drawbacks of the log-on procedure are as follow.
First, this approach is not realistic, because the warrantors do not have any
information about the new node to be guaranteed (the warrantors must have
minimal information about nodes, so that they can decide to guarantee or not).
Second, even the guest has already W certificates from guarantors, it cannot
succeed to have K certificates from CHs and it will not be certified. Third,
the network traffic generated by each new node in these procedure is at least
2 ∗ (W +K) packets. The Becheler’s architecture has some other drawbacks in
merging networks process, it assembles several networks in one network. As the
two network keys cannot be mixed, one of them must be dropped and the other
must be distributed over the whole network. The criterion to choose the dominate
key among these different network’s keys depends on the number of CHs of each
network. The network which has maximum CHs will become dominant network
and its network key remains private key of CA. These processes present a point
of failure, because in this architecture any node can construct its own cluster.
Thus, a set of malicious nodes can form their network with the maximum of
CHs, and then attack the network in order to merger in the network and take
the CA control.
This architecture does not contemplate the presence of two CHs in only
one cluster due to the mobility of the nodes. Furthermore, the selection criteria
of CHs are not mentioned in the paper. Also, to renew the network key, the
intervention of a trust third party is needed so that it can subdivide the new key
and distribute the fragment of the key over CHs. In the light of above factors,
we believe that this architecture is not well adapted for Ad hoc environments.
3 Architecture
Firstly, we define a new trust model on which is based our architecture. Secondly,
we present a clustering algorithm based trust and mobility metric to ensure a
selection of trust and relatively stable confident node as CH which will become
CA node in the cluster. Finally, we discuss how to evaluate certificate chain
between clusters.
3.1 Primitives
The basic idea of our architecture consists of establishing dynamic public key
infrastructure with CA as clusterhead that will change according to topology
changes. We propose a clustering algorithm based on this trust model. A new
concept is proposed to protect CA node in each cluster based on dispensable
nodes.
Definition 1 DDMZ is defined as the zone of 1-hop or more from CA. It is
formed by at least one or more confident nodes (RA). Their role is to not au-
thorize unknown nodes to communicate directly with CA node. All guest nodes
must be passed by DDMZ to request certificate from CA.
We assume that there are spare social relationships among nodes in order to
establish trust relationship of any to-be-trust node with confident nodes. Also,
every node has its own private/public key pair. Furthermore, the initial trust
nodes (or confident nodes) are honest and do not issue false certificates. More-
over, each node manages a trust table. Initially, each trust node knows the iden-
tity and public key of other trust nodes (ID,K+). It means, if we have initially
k trust nodes these nodes have k-1 entries (known mutually) in their trust table.
3.2 Trust Model
In our trust model, we define trust metric (Tm) as continuous value on the
[0..1] interval. A node i has a high trust value (Tm(i) = 1), if it is known and
exchanged keys over secure side channel (physical encounters and friends) with
one or more of confident nodes [8][2]. Another manner to obtain a high trust
value is that a node must prove its good faith by adapting a good behavior and
a cooperation. If a new node is added in the trust table by one or more confident
nodes all others confident nodes will be aware. This is because confident nodes
update and exchange their trust tables. Each new unknown node starts with
Tm = 0.1 its lower trust level.
Five roles of nodes are defined in each cluster and each role has particular
trust level:
– CAk : Certification authority of cluster k which certificate public key of
nodes belonging in the same cluster. CAk has high trust level, Tm value
must be equal one.
– RAi,k : Registration Authority of cluster k assured by trust node i. The mean
goal of RA is to protect CA against attackers that by DDMZ formation in
order to prevent direct communication between unknown nodes and CA, for
example, they treat and filter the requests of certification toward CA. Also,
RAs must be confident nodes with Tm(i) = 1.
– GWi,j : It is a gateway node ensuring a connection between two different
clusters i and j. These nodes must be certified by two different CA. GW
nodes must haves good trust level with Tm(g) ∈ [0.7− 1.0].
– MNi,k : it represents a member node i belonging to the cluster k which
success to pass from visitor to member status by well behaviour and good
cooperation. This status can be recommended by CAk to another CA node.
Node i can communicate inside and outside its cluster. It has an average
trust level Tm(i) ∈ [0.5− 0.7] .
– V Ni,k: It is a visitor node i that belongs to cluster k, it has low trust certifi-
cate, because CAk and RAj,k nodes need to have more information about
node i behavior. Node i cannot communicate outside its cluster. It has a
minimal trust level Tm(i) ∈ [0.1− 0.5] .
Figure 1 shows the state transition diagram where each state represents the
node’s role in each cluster.
Fig. 1. State transition diagram Fig. 2. Monitoring scheme
The hierarchical monitoring process consists to supervise behaviors of nodes.
Each node with high trust value monitors its neighbors nodes with low trust
value. Figure 2 shows the possibility of a node with certain status to monitor
other status nodes. CA can monitor other CAs and all other status. RA can
monitor {GW,MN,VN} status, also GW can supervise {MN,VN} status. Finally
MN node can supervise only VN status but VN cannot supervise any node.
In our trust model, the trust relationship is ensured by CAs between clusters.
A CA can recommend node, with certain trust level, belonging in its cluster to
another CA. It is also ensured by RA in order to recommend nodes which belong
in the same cluster to the CA.
The trust value of a path depends on its trust chain which is represented by
its certificate chain. The inter-cluster communication is based on the evaluation
of the certificate chain. The trust evaluation between two nodes consists to take
the small trust value of nodes (eg. Trust between RA and GW is min(1, w)
where w ∈ [0.7 − 0.9]). Figure 3 shows two examples of certificate chain. The
best trust chain (TC) is given in the case of b: TC(b) > TC(a).
Fig. 3. Certificate Chain
3.3 Distributed Clustering Algorithm
A clustering network in our architecture is ensured by a Secure Distributed
Clustering Algorithm (SDCA). The main rules of this algorithm are as follow:
1. Only confident nodes (Tm(i) = 1) can be candidate to become CA.
2. Each cluster-head is CA of only one cluster.
3. All confident neighbors of CA, can become RA in the cluster.
4. Other nodes are at distance of maximum d-hop from the CA according the
predefined size of cluster.
Our algorithm selects CA of the cluster according to trade-off between secu-
rity and stability. It is based on sending periodic beacons by each confident node
to its neighbors at predefined interval time. Based on information available in the
received beacons and after authentication and verification of beacon’s integrity,
the receivers update their information and decide about their cluster status.
The security parameter depends on trust metric, only nodes with Tm = 1
and at least one trust neighbor (to establish DDMZ) can be candidate to become
CA in the cluster. This constitutes the cluster formation condition. Moreover,
to reinforce the security of the cluster, the algorithm selects the candidate with
maximum trust degree; its means the trust node which has a maximum trust
neighbors.
The stability parameter is very important on clustering algorithm, this para-
meter is defined as cluster-head duration. Several clustering strategies have been
proposed in order to increase system stability, such as: Lowest-ID cluster-head
selection based on ID [10], max-connectivity algorithm [9]. In our algorithm, we
adopt a mobility metric [3][7] because this strategy gives good result 33% of
reduction in the number of cluster-head changes compared with last approach
[10][9].
Each trust node puts the following information in the beacon before trans-
mission:
– CA (Cluster-head): ID of the CA to which the node is attached.
– HopCount: hop count number to CA.
– Degree of Trust neighbors (DTN): each transmitter puts the number of its
trust neighbors and their identities.
– Relative mobility (RM): it indicates the relative stability of the trust node
with respect to its trust neighbors as presented in [4].
– ID number of the beacon (ID-num): it is the sequence number of the beacon
which is incremented by one at each beacon transmission by the node.
– Message Authenticated Code (MAC): this field is reserved to authenticate
the beacon information signed with private key of the sender.
(MACK−[CA,Hopcount,DTN,RM, ID − num])
This information permits to any trust receiver to authenticate the sender of
the beacon and verify the integrity of information.
At first, each trust node sends successive hello packet in order to calculate
the relative mobility RM, after that, it announces itself as CA by assigning
its own address to the CA field of the beacon and initializes the Hop Count.
When a trust node receives a beacon, from one of its neighbors, it executes the
clustering algorithm to change its status from clusterhead (CH that is also CA)
to RA or cluster-member only. The decision to change the status from CA to
cluster-member depends on two main factors: security and stability parameters.
Two security parameters in this algorithm have been defined: the trust level
and the numbers of trust neighbors of CA candidate. These parameters indicate
the security hardiness of the future cluster and the degree of attacks resistance.
Another parameter is introduced: the stability of the CA. A CA is considered
more stable than another one if it has low relative mobility. Any trust node
with relative mobility more than certain threshold is not considered stable and
will not enter in CA competition with others candidates. When competition
between two candidate CAs, the CA with lower trust neighbors and also more
relative mobility, loses the competition and becomes RA or member only, it
depends on the distance (i.e., hop count) from the winner CA. If the hop count
is equal to 1, the candidate CA becomes RA. It means that all trust nodes,
directly connected (one-hop) to CA winner, can become RA. The nodes situated
between two adjacent clusters can become gateway (GW). The below algorithm
1 is executed by each node which has high trust metric Tm = 1; these nodes
declare themselves as candidate to become CA. The extent of a node CA to
manage nodes (in its cluster) at one hope or more depends on the value of d.
In order to detect the topology changes, we introduce the movement detection
process. Movement of CA is detected by RA nodes while not receiving any beacon
from CA for predefined period of time. Also, cluster’s nodes can detect movement
of RA nodes by not receiving beacons from them. The movement detection of
nodes CA and RA is very important for the cluster lifetime.
Each cluster’s node other than CA or RA receives the beacon from CA. It
must verify the authentication and the integrity of the beacon information by
using the CA’s public key (KCA+). If the verification succeeds then the node
updates any change about hop-count or new RA. If CA changes, cluster nodes
verify the new CA identity. The information over the nodes can be assembled
by trust model.
Each member cluster’s node update periodically the cluster’s information (CA
and RA nodes), for more detail, the reader can refer to [4].
Algorithm 1: Clustering Algorithm executed by confident node
When receiving a beacon by node j from node i;
begin
Authentication do if (Tm(i)! = 1) then
RejectBeacon(); Goto(end);
else if (HopCount >= d) then
No−Competition; Goto(end);
else if (RMi < RMj) OR ((RMi == RMj) AND (DTNj < DTNi)) then
Accept node i as CA;
if (HopCount == 1) then
Status(j) = RA;
HopCount(i) = 1;
else
HopCount(i) = HopCount+ 1;
Status(j) =MN ;
else if (RMj < RMi) OR (DTNj > DTNi) then
node j remains as CA candidate;
else if (RMi == RMj) AND (DTNj == DTNi) then
apply Lowest-ID;
end
4 Performance evaluation
We have implemented our clustering algorithm as described previously. We use
Network Simulator (NS-2) [14] with CMU wireless extensions to simulate our
algorithm. Simulation scenarios were generated with parameters listed in the
table 1.
The movement of mobile nodes is randomly generated and continuous within
the whole simulation periode.
In order to compare the algorithm proposed in the previous section with others
clustering algorithms. We assume that all nodes of the network are high trust
level which means that any node can become CH.
In Figure 4, we note that there is difference between our algorithm, MOBIC
and Lowest-ID in the transmission range 50 m, because our algorithm need at
least two nodes to form cluster, only one (isolated node) cannot become CA
for security raison. In this simulation, the number of conceived clusters does
not exceed 25. With a transmission range between 50 and 125 m the number of
clusters decreases and more of 150 m the network become more stable. However,
while fixing d=2 we obtain less cluster-head compared to MOBIC and lowest-ID.
The cluster-head (CA) duration is the parameter which indicate the cluster
stability. The longer CA duration means the system is more stable. The simu-
lations with 100 nodes, 2500x2500 of scenarios size and 12.5m/s of maximum
speed gives 12.8 second of average CA duration.
Figure 5 shows the average number of different status of nodes in the network.
Algorithm 2: Algorithm executed by a node when its RA or CA is lost
If node i does not receive any beacon from CA after Timeout predefined;
begin
if It can recover CA with another RA then
Keep previous CA;
Update RA node and Hop count;
else if It can find another CA then
Join the new CA node;
if (Tm(i) == 1) then
if (HopCount == 1) then
Status(i) = RA NODE;
HopCount(newCA) = 1;
else
Status(i) =MN ;
HopCount(newCA) = HopCount+ 1;
else
Request Certificate to RA node;
end
Table 1. Simulation parameters
Parameter Value in our simulation
Number of nodes (N) 50
Network size (mxn) 670x670m2
Constant mobility 20 m/sec
Transmission Range 10 m - 125 m
Pause time 0.30 s
Broadcast interval (BI) 0.75-1.25 s
Discovery interval 10*BI s
Contention periode 3.0 s
The average number of isolated nodes (nodes cannot join any cluster) decreases
when the transmission range increases. Also the number of CAs decreases with
longer transmission range. The number of other nodes (member of different clus-
ters) increases when the transmission range increases. The number of isolated
nodes must be reduced to get more security communication in the network.
5 Security analysis
The security of our architecture depends directly on the trust model. The pres-
ence of a great number of confident nodes increases the security of the network.
Nodes with low trust level cannot participate in the CA election process. Only
a confident node can announce itself as CA candidate. If a malicious node try
to be introduced in the CA process election by announcing itself as candidate,
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the confident nodes can detect this in authentication phase showed in algorithm
1. If malicious nodes succeed to form their cluster and try to communicate with
other clusters; the CA of cluster destination can authenticate the CA of the
source cluster in inter-cluster communication. All communications from a mali-
cious cluster are ignored.
The Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack over CA node is prevented by DDMZ where
RA nodes filter all requests from unknown nodes. The robustness of DDMZ de-
pends on the number of RAs which collaborate in order to protect CA of their
cluster. If attackers try to impersonate legitimate nodes as CA or RA they will
be detected by monitoring process and then isolated from the network. The mali-
cious nodes can use the identity of legitimate nodes only if their private’s keys are
divulgated. If attackers try to compromise all the network, it must compromise
all CAs.
The number of clusters formed by our proposed solution is related to the
number and the mobility of confident nodes. The cluster size must be adapted
with number of confident nodes in order to well secure CA node. The presence
of two confident nodes is the minimum configuration of clustering and it must
be reinforced.
We can use the thresholds cryptography scheme in each cluster after CA election.
A CA divides its private key into n partial shares which are distributed over RA
nodes.
Our system’s architecture obliges nodes to collaborate and to adapt well
behaviors to obtain more trust levels. Each unknown node must begin with a
visitor status and then obtain the member status.
In order to evaluate the trust of CA authentication, we calculate the quality
of authentication (QoA), so that, we apply attenuation factor to trust chain
[6]. This factor is (1 − p)(d−1) where p is the probability of the existence of
compromised or a malicious node in the network and d the length of the trust
chain.
QoA(V1 − V2) = TC(V1 − V2) ∗ (1− p)(d−1) (1)
The more trust chain is longer the more risk to be compromised is important.
In this case the cluster size must be carefully chosen.
The QoA between two clusters depends of the trust chain (TC) which attach
CA nodes of clusters and also percentage of malicious nodes in the network. The
communication between CAs must passed via high trust chain and it is assured
by getaway nodes (GW).
The figure 6 illustrate the quality of authentication versus probability of
malicious nodes. We have plot curves in the case of cluster size 1 and 2 hop with
maximum and minimum values of TC respectively 1 and 0.49 (0.7 ∗ 0.7). We
remark the QoA linearly decrease with probability of malicious nodes increase
in the case of one hop of cluster size. When we increase the cluster size at two
hop we note that, QoA decrease more fast with probability of malicious nodes
than the case of one hop of cluster size.
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The figure 7 shows the general case of QoA with different values of TC and
probability of malicious nodes. We compare three case of cluster size 1, 2, and
3 hop, we remark the best value of QoA is in the case of one hop of cluster size,
low value of malicious nodes and high TC.
According to the last figures 7 and 6, we can conclude that, more of the
cluster size is large, the risk to have weak QoA is hight.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have proposed a new architecture based on our trust model
and clustering algorithm in order to distribute a certification authority (CA).
Our clustering algorithm is based on two parameters: security and stability.
The security factor is related to the trust model; only confident nodes can become
cluster-head and ensure CA role. The stability factor is presented by mobility
metric in order to give more stable clusters. In our approach, the trust model
is accomplished by monitoring process which allows any node with high trust
metric to monitor and evaluate other nodes with low trust metric. In addition,
we have proposed a new mechanism to protect CA, called DDMZ, which permits
to increase security robustness of clusters and endures malicious nodes that try
to attack CA or issue false certificates.
Our architecture ensures the security and availability of public key authen-
tication in each cluster. This architecture is adapted to any topology changes.
Simulation results of our clustering algorithm showed the improvement of
clusters stability compared to MOBIC and Lowest-ID algorithms. Furthermore,
we remark that availability and robustness of DDMZ depend on the transmission
range, the number and mobility of confidant nodes. We are also considering
energy conservation and lifetime of the network while conceiving clusters. Our
future work is to study and analyse our architecture in order to evaluate the
resistance degrees of DDMZ faced to different DoS attacks.
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